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Abstract
This article examines benefit-sharing in the context of climate finance. Both benefit-
sharing and climate finance are complex, heterogeneous, and fast-developing fields, 
where the interaction of international human rights law and climate law can create 
both clarity and confusion. Benefit-sharing as a means for greater equity and fairness 
is increasingly used or included in materials on climate finance, despite lacking clear 
conceptualization in this context. The article does three things. First, it establishes 
benefit-sharing as an emerging obligation in human rights law and environmental law. 
Second, it explores how benefit-sharing appears in the climate regime, with a view 
to determining whether benefit-sharing has a distinct meaning in this context – and, 
if so, what it is. The article argues that both the meaning and the practice of benefit-
sharing in climate finance are incoherent. Third, the article interrogates the possibilities 
and problems of adopting universalized norms of benefit-sharing in this context, and 
suggests some places where norms might be beneficial.
Keywords 
climate finance – international environmental law – international human rights law – 
benefit-sharing – participation
©  Kim Bouwer, 2021 | doi:10.1163/18786561-11010001
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of  the cc by 4.0 license.
Climate Law 11 (2021) 1-44
Downloaded from Brill.com05/07/2021 10:21:20AM
via University of Exeter
2
1 Introduction
This article examines fair and equitable benefit-sharing in climate finance 
law.1 The scope and normativity of benefit-sharing, as well as the institutional 
and regulatory framework of climate finance, are unsettled and continue to 
change shape. So, the article examines benefit-sharing obligations and prac-
tices in relation to project-based finance dispensed through the ‘climate funds’ 
(defined below). It borrows from jurisprudence in other areas of environmen-
tal law to inform this concept. The broad rationale for this approach is that 
although benefit-sharing has the potential to support just and equitable out-
comes in climate change responses, it remains undefined, so it is hard to dis-
cern any clear or definitive guidelines for benefit-sharing in climate finance. In 
this article I question the relative merits of universal and ad hoc approaches, 
but nevertheless suggest that the introduction of some universal norms could 
support a coherent and potentially more just approach to benefit-sharing in 
climate finance.
While its most significant articulation is in international biodiversity law, 
benefit-sharing is also used to compensate, reward, or engage various stake-
holders in climate adaptation and mitigation activities at the national and 
subnational levels.2 Benefit-sharing is increasingly deployed across the cli-
mate change landscape to support reallocation of advantages derived from 
climate responses.3 It is not mentioned in any core climate treaties, but, as dis-
cussed below, it could be read into the treaties as a requirement in a number 
1 The early research for this article was financially supported with a grant (no. 335592) from the 
European Research Council under the Benelex Project, run out of Strathclyde Centre for Law 
and Environmental Governance. It has been generously read by the other members of the 
Benelex Team, and Annalisa Savaresi, Kati Kulovesi, and Maria Manguiat also provided helpful 
comments on earlier versions. I am grateful to Alphaeus Ngonga for research assistance. Earlier 
versions were presented at the Society of Legal Scholars Conference at University College 
Dublin in 2017, the BeneLex Final Project Meeting, Ross Priory, Scotland in 2018, the iucn-ael 
Symposium at University of Strathclyde, Glasgow in 2018, and the Max Weber Fellows’ Law 
Writers’ Group, European University Institute, Florence in 2019. I am grateful to all present for 
their interest and helpful comments.
2 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Emergence of Benefit-Sharing under the Climate Regime: A 
Preliminary Exploration and Research Agenda’, University of Edinburgh School of Law Research 
Paper (Series No. 2014/43), September 2014.
3 Ibid.; and Ademola Oluborode Jegede, The Climate Change Regulatory Framework and 
Indigenous Peoples’ Lands in Africa: Human Rights Implications (Pretoria University Law Press, 
2016). However, these also arise in activities contributing to climate change, such as oil-and-gas 
extraction: see, generally, Lila Barrera-Hernandez, Barry Barton, Lee Godden, Alastair Lucas, 
and Anita Ronne, ‘Introduction: Sharing Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity’, 
in Lila Barrera-Hernández, Barry Barton, Lee Godden, Alastair Lucas, and Anita Ronne (eds), 
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of ways, and in particular through the stipulation that human rights should 
be respected and the vulnerable should be protected. In theory, benefit-shar-
ing could be employed to carve out spaces for justice and equity in the cli-
mate regime, where it could be used to engineer more positive and equitable 
outcomes in cases where climate responses might embed or worsen existing 
patterns of inequity. Benefit-sharing could contribute to ensuring that the 
advantages generated by the responses to climate change are allocated in a fair 
and equitable manner.4
Simultaneously, the adoption of the Paris Agreement, with its introduc-
tion of common but differentiated climate commitments for all parties, has 
brought climate finance into sharp focus. According to the working definition 
of the unfccc’s Standing Committee on Finance, ‘climate finance’ is ‘the finan-
cial resources dedicated to adapting to and mitigating climate change globally, 
including in the context of financial flows to developing countries’.5 The provi-
sion of climate finance is an obligation of developed countries,6 and parties to 
the Paris Agreement are committed to making ‘finance flows consistent with a 
pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient develop-
ment’.7 For now, the supply, sources, sufficiency, and transparency of climate 
finance dominate the conversation, and discussions around climate justice and 
equity tend to address broader questions around ethical responsibility and bur-
den-sharing. Although there is increasing attention on human rights impacts at 
the recipient end of climate finance, very little attention has been paid to bene-
fit-sharing in climate finance per se.8 The prospect (or necessity) of a consider-
able upswing in climate finance means that questions about justice in climate 
finance need to be given urgent thought, to ensure that mechanisms in climate 
finance support rather than undermine the achievement of fairness and equity.
Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity: Legal Change and Impact on 
Communities (Oxford University Press, 2016).
4 Annalisa Savaresi and Kim Bouwer, ‘Equity and Justice in Climate Change Law and Policy: 
A Role for Benefit-Sharing’, in Research Handbook on Climate Justice, edited by Tasneen Jafry 
(Routledge, 2018).
5 unfccc scf, 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows: Technical 
Report, <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018%20BA%20Technical%20
Report%20Final.pdf>, para. 13. This is not a universally accepted or uncontentious definition, 
and the absence of a clear definition on climate finance is not accidental: Romain Weikmans, 
J. Timmons Roberts, and Stacy-Ann Robinson, ‘What Counts as Climate Finance? Define 
Urgently’ (2020) 588 Nature 220. This is not, however, an issue that needs to be resolved in this 
article.
6 Paris Agreement, Article 9.
7 Ibid., Article 2(1)(c).
8 Although see Savaresi, supra note 2.
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This leads to the main question of this article: Is benefit-sharing an existing 
or emerging norm in international climate law and the international law of 
climate finance? Subsidiary to this are considerations including what the con-
tent of that norm might be, how it resembles or differs from benefit-sharing 
in other contexts, and whether benefit-sharing in climate finance should have 
its own characteristics or be subject to ad hoc practice. I aim in this article to 
answer the main question, and I will offer some reflections on the subsidiary 
questions, which are difficult to answer definitively.
There are several things that this article does not do. First, regarding method-
ology, there is much to be gained from a sociological evaluation of the efficacy 
and equity of benefit-sharing arrangements or other participatory processes 
in a variety of contexts, but this is a different project from the one undertaken 
here. A modest textual review was conducted as a scoping exercise. Second, 
the focus here is very narrowly on the potential to achieve equity and fairness 
within climate responses,9 specifically in relation to benefit-sharing. The effec-
tiveness of these projects (both financially and in terms of climate goals) is 
of course important, but this is beyond the scope of the article.10 Third, the 
article is focused on the provision of finance through the ‘climate funds’, viz. 
the intermediary bodies (outlined in Section 3) established or brought under 
the climate regime to distribute climate finance, and which purport to employ 
benefit-sharing in relation to projects in (usually) developing countries. This is 
a good starting point for this kind of enquiry. Fourth, I do not, therefore, directly 
consider the funding mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol,11 the 
specific benefit-sharing arrangements applicable to forests,12 or any arrange-
ments being contemplated under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. All of these 
9 More generally, see Friedrich Soltau, Fairness in International Climate Change Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009).
10 It should be possible to do both. See, however, e.g., Tomilola Eni-ibukun, ‘Climate Justice: 
The Clean Development Mechanism as a Case Study’, in Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi, and 
Michael Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law (Springer Netherlands, 2013).
11 Specifically, the Clean Development Mechanism. Although see Savaresi, supra note 2, 8–10.
12 There is extensive literature about benefit-sharing in REDD+; see Savaresi and Bouwer, supra 
note 3, section 3(a); Jegede, supra note 3; Cecilia Luttrell, Lasse Loft, Maria Fern Gebara, 
Demetrius Kweka, Maria Brockhaus, Arild Angelson, and William Sunderlin, ‘Who Should 
Benefit from REDD+? Rationales and Realities’, 18 Ecology and Society 52 (2013); Kathleen 
Birrell and Lee Godden, ‘Benefits and Sharing: Realizing Rights in REDD+’, 9 Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 6 (2018); Grace Yee Wong, Lasse Loft, Maria Brockhaus, 
Anastasia Lu Yang, Thu Thuy Pham, Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, and Cecilia Luttrell, 
‘An Assessment Framework for Benefit Sharing Mechanisms to Reduce Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation within a Forest Policy Mix’, 27 Environmental Policy 
and Governance 436 (2017); Sophie Chapman, Martijn Wilder, and Ilona Miller, ‘Defining 
bouwer
Climate Law 11 (2021) 1-44Downloaded from Brill.com05/07/2021 10:21:20AM
via University of Exeter
5
result in financial flows broadly called ‘climate finance’, but they are governed 
by specific instruments and require separate consideration on their own mer-
its.13 I have used some of the critical literature about these mechanisms to 
inform my own analysis.14
The next section discusses the status of the norm of benefit-sharing in 
international climate finance law, questioning whether a norm exists and how 
it is distinct from norms in other areas of international environmental law. 
Following that, Section 3 explains what is meant by climate finance in this arti-
cle, and explains where benefit-sharing obligations already exist in the climate 
funds. Section 4 draws on the jurisprudence discussed in Section 2 to suggest 
what a developed norm of climate finance might look like, seeking to illustrate 
where existing practices are helpful, where distinctions need to be made, and 
where difficulties could be anticipated.
2 Benefit-Sharing
2.1 Benefit-Sharing in International Environmental Law and Human 
Rights Law
Benefit-sharing was developed to ensure that indigenous peoples or local com-
munities with a legal or moral stake in the exploitation of their land, property, 
or traditional knowledge have a right to share in the benefits derived from these 
processes. Examples include: profit-sharing in circumstances where indigenous 
traditional knowledge is exploited commercially, also called bio-prospecting 
(research and innovation based on genetic resources);15 or ensuring local com-
munity access to employment and shareholding opportunities in mining or 
extractive industries.16 Benefit-sharing obligations are becoming ubiquitous in 
the Legal Elements of Benefit Sharing in the Context of REDD+’, 4 Carbon and Climate 
Law Review 270 (2014); Julia Dehm, ‘Indigenous Peoples and REDD+ Safeguards: Rights as 
Resistance or as Disciplinary Inclusion in the Green Economy?’ (2016) 7 Journal of Human 
Rights and the Environment 170.
13 Eni-ibukun, supra note 10.
14 Most significantly, Damilola Olawuyi, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Carbon Finance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016).
15 See Saskia Vermeylen, ‘Contextualizing “Fair” and “Equitable”: The San’s Reflections on the 
Hoodia Benefit-Sharing Agreement’, 12 Local Environment 423 (2007).
16 Hanri Mostert, Kangwa-Musole Chisanga, Janine Howard, Fatima Mandhu, Meyer van den 
Berg, and Cheri-Leigh Young, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Mining Industries of 
Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia: Choices and Consequences’, in Barrera-Hernández, et 
al. (eds), supra note 3.
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international human rights law and in international environmental law, most 
prominently in international biodiversity law. However, benefit-sharing is still 
quite incoherent as a concept, and has a mixed track-record in terms of the 
equity and justice that are the purported aims of these arrangements. The first 
two subsections deal with these ideas. They draw heavily on the cross-sectoral 
literature on benefit-sharing, although space does not permit a full elaboration 
of how benefit-sharing is articulated across the different regimes. The third 
subsection explores the status and usefulness of benefit-sharing in interna-
tional climate law. Later, Section 4, relying heavily on the jurisprudence refer-
enced herein, fleshes out the possible content of a norm of benefit-sharing in 
climate finance.
Benefit-sharing is a positive obligation in some areas of international envi-
ronmental law and human rights law. The most developed articulation of ben-
efit-sharing, reflecting the rights of indigenous peoples (ip) in international 
law, appears under the Convention for Biological Diversity. The cbd lays down 
the rights of ip to benefit-sharing in the use of their traditional knowledge, 
innovations, and practices relating to nature conservation and bio-prospect-
ing.17 The cbd’s formulation of benefit-sharing may be considered authori-
tative; it is well developed through ancillary instruments, specifically the 
Nagoya Protocol,18 as well as the 2004 Akwé: Kon Guidelines on environmen-
tal and socio-cultural assessments,19 which provide detail on, and support 
for, the implementation of benefit-sharing under the Nagoya Protocol.20 The 
cbd enjoys high levels of participation and ratification, entailing high levels 
of consensus – although, as is well known, the United States is not a party. 
In this context the cbd may be considered complementary to international 
human rights law,21 and perhaps also to other international regimes for the 
17 Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, 1760 unts 79, Article 8(j).
18 Specifically, the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
29 October 2010, for the promotion of benefit-sharing from the use of natural resources.
19 Akwe: Kon Guidelines (cbd Decision vii/16C(2004) Annex).
20 Global South scholars are more critical; see Jorge Cabrera Medaglia, ‘Access and Benefit-
Sharing: North-South Challenges in Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and Its Nagoya Protocol’, in Shawkat Alam, Attapattu Sumudu, Carmen Gonzalez, and 
Jona Razzaque (eds), International Environmental Law and the Global South (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015); Kanchana Kariyawasam and Matthew Tsai, ‘Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit Sharing: Implications of Nagoya Protocol on Providers and Users’, 21 
Journal of World Intellectual Property 289 (2018).
21 Case of the Kalina and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname Merits Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 309 (25 Nov. 2015), para. 174 (hereinafter Kalina Case).
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protection of the environment. On the other hand, the vague and voluntary 
nature of the 2004 Guidelines may be seen as an attempt by cbd parties to 
limit the international law-making implications of treaty-related guidelines.22
In 2018, benefit-sharing was included as a Framework Principle (fp) – one of 
the core human rights obligations in the environmental context – in the final 
report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, 
John Knox.23 In particular, FP15 requires states to ensure the fair and equita-
ble sharing of benefits with indigenous peoples or local communities (iplc) 
in relation to use of their lands, territories, or resources,24 where ‘local com-
munities’ refers to traditional communities which do not define themselves 
as indigenous but have a close relationship with nature and depend on this 
relationship for material or cultural survival.25 The fp s expand on what ben-
efit-sharing should entail, particularly regarding the need for early and proper 
consultation,26 just and fair redress for harm,27 and free, prior, and informed 
consent.28 While the fp s are not meant to create new obligations or represent 
authoritative treaty interpretation,29 they are authoritative statements reflect-
ing actual or emerging law. Knox states that the principles reflect ‘minimum 
standards’ of protection, should be seen as best practice, and either reflect 
existing law or should expeditiously and formally be adopted as norms.30 The 
22 Elisa Morgera, ‘Dawn of a New Day? The Evolving Relationship between the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and International Human Rights Law’, 53 Wake Forest Law Review 101 
(2018), 119.
23 John Knox, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations 
Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN General 
Assembly 2018, A/hrc/37/59, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G18/017/29/PDF/G1801729.pdf?OpenElement>.
24 Ibid., Principle 15, para. (d). fp 15 protects the rights of indigenous people and traditional 
communities, and further emphasizes the need to respect their rights and interests, the 
importance of free, prior, and informed consent being obtained through consultation when 
their rights are affected, and the importance of respecting their traditional knowledge and 
practices.
25 Knox, supra note 23, para. 48. The paragraph continues: ‘Examples include the descendants 
of Africans brought to Latin America as slaves, who escaped and formed tribal communities. 
To protect the human rights of the members of such traditional communities, States owe 
them obligations as well. While those obligations are not always identical to those owed to 
indigenous peoples, they should include the obligations described below’ (see A/hrc/34/49, 
paras. 52–8). Paragraph 53 makes express reference to benefit-sharing.
26 Ibid., fp 9.
27 Ibid., paras 51–3.
28 Ibid., fp 15(b).
29 Morgera, supra note 22.
30 Knox, supra note 23, paras 8–9.
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inclusion of benefit-sharing in the fp s reflects the status of benefit-sharing as 
a principle of international human rights law (discussed below), as well as the 
treaty-based recognition of indigenous peoples’ human rights, in particular 
under ilo Convention 169.31 The fp s recognize that not all states have ratified 
the underlying treaties; nevertheless, they were considered by Knox to be suffi-
ciently broadly accepted by international bodies and reflected in state practice 
to constitute established norms.32
It is notable that, despite these authoritative statements supporting bene-
fit-sharing in international human rights law, Knox had to rely heavily on the 
cbd and associated guidance to flesh out the detail of what is required for fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing. Benefit-sharing has also been applied directly or 
interpreted as an obligation in decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,33 and the Court’s jurisprudence favours reliance on guidance adopted 
under the cbd to support understandings of benefit-sharing in human rights 
law and natural resources law.34 This makes sense when the obligations on ben-
efit-sharing in human rights law are subjected to further examination: on the 
whole they are quite abstract and yield little guidance on practical application.35 
This is probably the reason for Knox’s careful framing of benefit-sharing as an 
‘emerging’ principle of international law.
Benefit-sharing arrangements also appear in connection with the exploita-
tion and measures for the conservation of natural resources such as water;36 
and in connection with agriculture (for instance in relation to seed-resilience 
schemes),37 energy projects, and extractive activities.38 While these frame-
works indicate that benefit-sharing is required in specific contexts, they do 
not contain the level of detail on substance or procedure developed under the 
31 International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 
(No. 169) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
Article 15.
32 Knox, supra note 23, para. 9.
33 Kalina Case, supra note 21.
34 Ibid., 193. Also see Elisa Morgera, ‘Under the Radar: The Role of Fair and Equitable Benefit-
Sharing in Protecting and Realising Human Rights Connected to Natural Resources’, 7 The 
International Journal of Human Rights 1098 (2019).
35 Ibid.
36 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Resolution X.19: Wetlands 
and River Basin Management: Consolidated Scientific and Technical Guidance (2008), 
Annex, para. 25.
37 Food and Agriculture Organization, Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (vggt), UN 
Doc. cl 144/9 (C 2013/20) (2012), Appendix D, Article 8.6.
38 See Barrera-Hernández, et al., supra note 3.
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cbd; for instance, on when benefit-sharing arrangements might be triggered, 
on what counts as a benefit, and on how such matters should be decided. As 
such, benefit-sharing arrangements may be deployed in a variety of contexts 
and circumstances that are different to the approach taken under the cbd. The 
scope and content of specific arrangements may, in those instances, be deter-
mined by requirements embedded, for instance, in national or international 
law, or by voluntary guidelines adopted by national or subnational govern-
ments, contracts, or corporate standards or practice. The picture is therefore 
fairly messy: it can be difficult to establish what benefit-sharing is taken to 
mean in all of the contexts in which it is used – or, indeed, whether there is any 
sectoral consistency.
2.2 Arguments about Universality or Ad Hoc Approaches to  
Benefit-Sharing in International Law
Accordingly, benefit-sharing is an emerging norm of international law with 
high-consensus support for its legal significance, seeking to protect the rights 
of iplc in specifically defined contexts. There is strong authority that supports 
the integration of benefit-sharing across regimes in a way that resembles the 
application of benefit-sharing under the cbd (discussed above). Yet, on the 
whole, where benefit-sharing is already used in the climate regime,39 it more 
closely resembles human rights protection, most likely because it is more fre-
quently used to counter the impacts of climate responses than to empower 
participation in for-profit activities.40 Benefit-sharing also appears on an ad 
hoc basis in various private or domestic instruments in relation to various cli-
mate response measures. The way these arrangements are conceptualized and 
formulated is mostly instance-specific.
So, returning to the questions tackled in this article and discussed in the first 
section: while the case for the existence of an emerging norm of benefit-sharing 
in international law is compelling, the answers to the subsidiary questions are 
less clear and are difficult to disentangle. We still need to know to what extent 
benefit-sharing as deployed in climate law or climate finance law resembles 
39 Which includes forests: Decision 1/cp.16, Cancun Agreements, UN Doc. fccc/cp/2010/7/
Add.1, Appendix I, para. 2. REDD+ does not expressly require benefit-sharing but it is 
routinely used; see Wong, et al., supra note 12, and climate finance, as discussed below. See 
Savaresi and Bouwer, supra note 4.
40 Savaresi, supra note 2, 15. However, the discussions in the climate regime around the 
amelioration of the social and economic consequences of mitigation responses to climate 
change, called ‘response measures’, are both broader and more long-standing than benefit-
sharing; see Nicholas Chan, ‘The “New” Impacts of the Implementation of Climate Change 
Response Measures’, 25 RECIEL 228 (2016).
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the more established formulation under the cbd, or whether it should do so. 
This gives rise to further questions about whether any differences are prefera-
ble, or even necessary, and whether standardization is likely to support better 
results or provide assurances relating to equity and fairness.
On the one hand, strong arguments can be made for sustaining these defined 
universal norms, not least in order to establish coherence in the use of such 
arrangements, and to ensure that gains in some areas are not lost in others.41 
It is valuable to extract key normative concepts from specific cross-sectorial 
practices in order to provide headline guidance for the development of ben-
efit-sharing arrangements in different contexts.42 This article attempts this in 
the Section 4. On the other hand, it is clear that the idea of universalized norms 
is not universally accepted,43 and equally strong arguments can be made for 
flexibility and responsiveness in different areas. The reasons for this relate to the 
particularity of benefit-sharing arrangements and how these should be devel-
oped in each set of circumstances. The very specific and localized nature of 
many of these arrangements is a reason for ad hoc development,44 the rationale 
being to avoid the imposition of predetermined features on vulnerable people. 
Universalized norms could overwhelm the contribution made by the supposed 
benefit-recipients in the course of their own participation – for instance, by lim-
iting the scope for them to shape their own arrangements according to their 
values and preferences. These considerations include the importance of the 
vulnerable participants’ voices and priorities in framing the nature and circum-
stances of the arrangements. In essence, it is accepted practice that benefits 
should genuinely reflect net benefits to the receiving community, and that this 
cannot be standardized but must be developed de novo in each instance.
There is, however, a significant trend arising in the practice of benefit-sharing 
that would motivate the development of headline norms for these kinds of 
safeguards. Despite the absence of treaty recognition of benefit-sharing in the 
climate regime, there is widespread if varied practice on benefit-sharing on 
various levels, seemingly without clear articulation as to what benefit-sharing 
means, or consistency in minimum standards or best practice. These arrange-
ments are unlikely to be developed entirely ad hoc. In some cases they might be 
41 Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit 
Sharing’, 27 European Journal of International Law 353 (2016). Discussions under the cbd 
have fleshed out this concept: ibid., 365f.
42 Chapman, Wilder, and Miller, supra note 12.
43 For instance, Chapman, Wilder, and Miller, supra note 12, argue for similar reasons against 
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regulated through national legislation or formal guidance or codes.45 However, 
there also appears to be a proliferation of approaches to benefit-sharing in 
(predominantly) private instruments, where norms develop that are specific 
to a sectoral context or even to key actors in an industry or field.46 They include 
formal and informal as well as sector- or industry-specific codes of industry 
practice or private contracts, in various contexts.47 This could happen through 
corporate standard-form agreements forming the basis (or entirety) of agree-
ments, or through more subtle processes whereby the idea, content, and pro-
cess of the agreement become replicated through exchange.48 These contracts, 
together with any industry codes, would to some extent standardize bene-
fit-sharing within an industry,49 which may not be done in a way that meets 
the aspirations of benefit-sharing. For instance, Affolder argues that the var-
iegation of voluntary contractual arrangements used for forest conservation 
entrenches private authority within the broader field.50 What is not clear is 
the extent to which the subjects of the benefit-sharing arrangements – the fre-
quently vulnerable ‘recipients’ of benefits – are able to shape the relationships 
formed under these agreements in different contexts.51 If the appreciation of 
the vast power imbalance between the contracting parties is inherent in the 
45 Savaresi and Bouwer, supra note 4, section 2(a). E.g. the South African National 
Environmental Management Protected Areas Act (Act 57 of 2003). For a comparative 
discussion of domestic legislative approaches to benefit-sharing under REDD+ in three 
African countries, see Jegede, supra note 3.
46 Ibid.; and Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Community Development Agreements in the Mining 
Industry: An Emerging Global Phenomenon’, 44 Community Development 222 (2013). 
On private and ‘quasi-private’ standards generally, see Joanne Scott, ‘Private and Quasi-
Private Standards’, in Lavanya Rajamani and Jacqueline Peel (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2021).
47 Yinka Omorogbe, ‘Resource Control and Benefit Sharing in Nigeria’, in Barrera-Hernández, 
et al. (eds), supra note 4, sections iv-vi.
48 O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 46; Natasha Affolder, ‘Looking for Law in Unusual Places: Cross-
Border Diffusion of Environmental Norms’, 7 Transnational Environmental Law 425 (2018), 
section 3.
49 Even if setting standards is not an overt aim of these agreements, it suggests that they can 
constitute a form of private governance, with their use by repeat players implicitly setting 
industry standards. See Neil Craik, Holly Gardner, and Daniel McCarthy, ‘Indigenous-
Corporate Private Governance and Legitimacy: Lessons Learned from Impact and Benefit 
Agreements’, 52 Resources Policy 379 (2017). On private standards generally, see Scott, supra 
note 46.
50 Natasha Affolder, ‘Transnational Carbon Contracting: Why Law’s Invisibility Matters’, in A. 
Claire Cutler and Thomas Dietz (eds), The Politics of Private Transnational Governance by 
Contract (Routledge, 2017).
51 Omorogbe, supra note 46.
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rationale for benefit-sharing,52 the risk of an equity deficit in negotiations due 
to gaps in commercial sophistication, negotiating acumen, knowledge gaps, 
and political leverage – fundamentally, power – must also be appreciated.53 
In some circumstances, benefit-recipients have become sophisticated negoti-
ators, and are able to negotiate favourable terms and assert their rights judi-
ciously and enforce them judicially.54 But securing and enforcing satisfactory 
arrangements should not be contingent on this, and there is clear evidence 
that where corporate practices are developed ad hoc in circumstances of poor 
(or no) institutional guidance, this can give rise to substantial shortcomings 
in terms of both procedural and substantive legitimacy, with the result that 
the value of ‘benefits’ is dubious given the overall economic picture of the 
project.55 There is also the undeniable reality that, no matter how skilled they 
might be in negotiation, all parties are aware that the iplc in most cases do not 
have power to prevent or relocate the project.
This also creates challenges in terms of knowledge and understanding. 
Commercial contracts are opaque and inaccessible for ‘commercial sensitiv-
ity’ reasons, meaning for the most part that where they do constitute industry 
standards on benefit-sharing they cannot be evaluated or compared with other 
arrangements or international norms, or assessed for how they might support 
just and equitable outcomes. While confidentiality on some features can pro-
tect the interests of vulnerable benefit-recipients,56 standard confidentiality 
erodes transparency and the potential for cross-community learning, as well as 
any holistic discussion of benefits, and accordingly disadvantages other groups 
in negotiations.57 A standardization approach that includes requirements to 
introduce benefit-sharing, defined with reference to minimum international 
52 Ken J. Caine and Naomi Krogman, ‘Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A Power Analysis of 
Impact and Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North’, 23 Organization and Environment 76 
(2010).
53 Ibid.; O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 46; and Paola Velasco Herrejon and Annalisa Savaresi, 
‘Wind Energy, Benefit-Sharing and Indigenous Peoples: Lessons from the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, Southern Mexico’, 1 Oil, Gas and Energy Law Journal (2020), section 3.1.
54 Alastair Lucas, ‘Participatory Rights and Strategic Litigation’, in Barrera-Hernández, et al. 
(eds), supra note 2.
55 Craik, Gardner, and McCarthy, supra note 49; Louise Schwemmer, Rina Grant, Wendy 
Anneke, and Stefanie Freitag-Ronaldson, ‘Toward More Effective Benefit Sharing in South 
African National Parks’, 28 Society and Natural Resources 4 (2015).
56 The broader arguments around confidentiality in commercial contracts are complex and 
multi-layered, and certainly without these crucial protections projects as a whole may be 
jeopardized, which may be to the detriment of the benefit recipients or the projects per se. 
So the suggestion is not to ‘do away with’ confidential contracts in and of themselves, but 
merely that benefit arrangements can be problematic if concluded on this basis.
57 Caine and Krogman, supra note 52, 86.
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standards, and includes arrangements for ongoing dialogue, could require 
transparency in these arrangements.58 This could support other communi-
ties in understanding the possibilities, procedures, and gains made elsewhere, 
as well as ensure that rights won in other contexts are not negotiated away. 
Indeed, the need to regulate private actors and to ensure that benefit-sharing 
arrangements meet minimum standards was a significant motivator for Knox 
to require the formalization of a norm of benefit-sharing.
Adjacent to questions about the content of the norm in specific contexts 
lies the issue that while benefit-sharing has the potential to yield positive and 
powerful results, there are strong indications that it is at best difficult to eval-
uate it in terms of effectiveness;59 at worst, it fails as a tool of engagement. 
The empirical evidence evaluating benefit-sharing arrangements across a 
variety of contexts reveals mixed results at best.60 For instance, even though 
the cbd regime provides the most detailed guidance on the implementation 
of benefit-sharing arrangements, benefit-sharing arrangements introduced 
in accordance with this guidance are not above criticism in their own con-
text.61 Problems range from failures in engagement and participation, failures 
of benefit-sharing arrangements to improve the situation of recipients, and 
a range of unintended consequences. In some instances the arrangements 
reflect poor recognition of the recipients’ preferences and interests, resulting 
in useless or unhelpful arrangements or loss of property rights or community 
space in exchange for their traditional knowledge.62 In others, poorly designed 
arrangements have caused or exacerbated community tensions, causing vio-
lent conflict.63 The diversity of circumstances in which these arrangements 
are employed, and the arrangements’ frequent opacity (even to benefit-recip-
ients), has meant that establishing precisely what went wrong and how to fix 
it has presented tremendous challenges. Of course, this also begs the question 
about what success in benefit-sharing arrangements might mean, despite the 
58 See Olawuyi, supra note 14, 119f, on the benefits of transparency in carbon projects.
59 Caine and Krogman, supra note 52, 81.
60 Louisa Parks, Benefit-Sharing in Environmental Governance (Routledge, 2019), Chapters 2 and 
3.
61 Medaglia, supra note 20.
62 Vermeylen, supra note 15; Ara Azad and Ava Azad, ‘Energy Justice, Climate Justice, and 
Financing Innovation’, in Randall Abate (ed.), Climate Justice (Environmental Law Institute, 
2016); Shalanda H. Baker, ‘Project Finance and Sustainable Development in the Global 
South’, in Alam, et al. (eds), supra note 20.
63 J. S. Kemerink-Seyoum, T. M. Tadessea, W. K. Mershaa, A. E. C. Dukera, and C. De Fraiture, 
‘Sharing Benefits or Fueling Conflicts? The Elusive Quest for Organizational Blue-Prints in 
Climate Financed Forestry Projects in Ethiopia’, 53 Global Environmental Change 265 (2018).
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suggestion that these may be evaluated according to how they ‘continue to 
provide meaningful benefits to those signed on to them and enhance their 
ability to negotiate more effectively over time for those benefits that are per-
ceived as fair and potentially necessary to tolerate the negative impacts of 
development’.64
The emblematic features of many of these relationships are deep inequality 
in resources, knowledge and (sometimes) savoir faire, and inherent power imbal-
ances. A case can be made that even where benefit-sharing arrangements can 
afford much-needed recognition to communities,65 there is a limit to what can be 
achieved in terms of the distributive power of benefit-sharing arrangements, and 
that these very inequities may make the achievement of fair, or indeed entirely 
voluntary arrangements, impossible. For instance, the offered arrangements 
could be seen as a ‘bribe’ or an unsavoury inducement to marginalized people 
with few other options.66 This raises all sorts of questions as to whether, despite 
their increasing use in practice and academic interest, introducing contractual 
or quasi-contractual arrangements in such a context could ever be entirely vol-
untary, or whether they could ever support fairer outcomes than otherwise, let 
alone address underlying distributive issues.
This presents something of a conundrum for the development of bene-
fit-sharing both as a concept and as a practice. It is problematic to promote 
as a normative ‘good’ a mechanism that is substantially failing as a tool of 
engagement in most of its current manifestations. But given the broad and 
increasing use of these arrangements, perhaps using best endeavours to ensure 
an approximation to fairness and voluntary engagement, while acknowledg-
ing that the practice of benefit-sharing will be imperfect, is the best that can 
be achieved in most contexts.67 It is unlikely that moral and political pressure 
to distribute the benefits of carbon projects will lessen in the future, and so 
benefit-sharing will continue to be used in the climate context.
64 O’Faircheallaigh, cited in Caine and Krogman, supra note 52, 89.
65 Parks, supra note 60, chapter 4.
66 Noel Cass, Gordon Walker, and Patrick Devine-Wright, ‘Good Neighbours, Public Relations 
and Bribes: The Politics and Perceptions of Community Benefit Provision in Renewable 
Energy Development in the UK’, 12 Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 255 (2010); 
and Gardar Arnason and Doris Schroeder, ‘Exploring Central Philosophical Concepts in 
Benefit Sharing: Vulnerability, Exploitation and Undue Inducement’, in Doris Schroeder 
and Julie Cook (eds), Benefit Sharing: From Biodiversity to Human Genetics (Springer, 2013)–
although the authors dispute that this is always necessarily the case.
67 Chiara Armeni, ‘Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: Reflecting on Planning 
and Community Benefits for Major Wind Farms’, 28 Journal of Environmental Law 415 (2016). 
See also Louisa Parks and Elisa Morgera, ‘The Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Norm Diffusion: The Case of Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing’, 24 RECIEL 353 (2015), 356.
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But none of the above is necessarily a definitive argument against the for-
malization of headline norms. It is not clear whether any of the above difficul-
ties could be avoided if clear universal norms and minimum standards were 
established, and in turn whether problems could be avoided through better 
institutions, better enforcement, and the more sensitive application of core 
principles. A clear norm would at least put parties on an equal footing by pre-
serving minimum standards or best practices in relation to benefit-sharing, in 
that these would be standardized through instruments informed by human 
rights, rather than corporate expedience. It would also make benefit-sharing 
arrangements more likely to be deployed in circumstances where they are 
required. This would not preclude the negotiation of more favourable or desir-
able conditions by some benefit-recipients where appropriate or possible, nor 
would it preclude parties from agreeing to arrangements that represent an 
improvement or progression beyond universalized minimum standards, yet 
still ensure that gains won in one area are not lost in others. An alternative 
view is that the arrangements are fundamentally ideologically or conceptually 
flawed and can never deliver equity and justice in the way envisaged,68 but (as 
flagged above) this is an argument less against the standardization of arrange-
ments than against the use of benefit-sharing arrangements per se.
2.3 Benefit-Sharing in the Climate Regime
There are no express provisions on benefit-sharing in the climate treaties. 
However, it is possible to read in benefit-sharing as required by other treaty 
protections, in particular references to human rights, as discussed below. The 
absence of a conflict clause in the unfccc may be understood to mandate 
harmonious interpretations of the regimes on human rights and climate. ‘As 
there is no intrinsic priority of one set of [regime] obligations over [an]other, 
when faced with implementation conflicts, obligations under the unfccc 
should be interpreted in such a way as to support, rather than conflict with, 
human rights.’69
Some celebrate the inclusion of human rights as a triumph of the Paris 
Agreement (pa),70 but the Framework Convention already ‘echo[ed] con-
cerns closely aligned with human rights obligations – from a recognition of 
68 For instance, Birrell and Godden, supra note 12, critique benefit-sharing as the 
‘commodification of a moral imperative’.
69 Savaresi, supra note 2, 16.
70 Daniel Klein, Maria Pia Carazo, Meinhard Doelle, Jane Bulmer, Andrew Higham, and Inge 
Knittke (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 114–17.
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the central role of the principle of equity, to [the] need to acknowledge the 
vulnerability of specific groups, or to references to … public participation’.71 
The Cancun Agreements require respect for human rights in relation to all cli-
mate responses;72 this supported the introduction of social and environmental 
safeguards.73 There is also emphasis on human rights and protection of the 
vulnerable in the pa,74 both in the express inclusion of a human rights refer-
ence and through the increasing ‘relevance of human rights norms’ in the cli-
mate regime.75 The pa requires parties ‘when taking action to address climate 
change, [to] respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on 
human rights’, including the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, 
and ‘people in vulnerable situations’, as well as in relation to the right to devel-
opment. The fairly watery wording and positioning of this provision suggest 
that its authority and usefulness are circumscribed.76 However, some recogni-
tion (albeit weak) is afforded to principles related to human rights, particularly 
in relation to matters of procedure and participation and the rights of indige-
nous peoples.77 Article 12 of the pa emphasizes the importance of procedural 
rights, requiring co-operation in relation to various measures including ‘public 
participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of 
these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement’.78 Thus 
although the pa does not expressly incorporate human rights obligations into 
the climate regime, the above references could be seen as asserting the impor-
tance of the protection of human rights in the face of the climate challenge.79
The 2018 Paris ‘Rulebook’ includes provisions on modalities, procedures, 
and guidelines for the operation of the pa, including mechanisms for increased 
transparency and accountability, as well as compliance.80 Hopes for a strongly 
‘rights-based’ implementation package were not fulfilled, but this is consistent 
with its overall tone and wording of the rules, which are strongly procedural 
71 Sébastien Duyck, ‘Delivering on the Paris Promises? Review of the Paris Agreement’s 
Implementing Guidelines from a Human Rights Perspective’, 9 Climate Law 202 (2019), 204, 
and section 2.1.
72 Decision 1/cp.16, The Cancun Agreements (fccc/cp/2010/7/Add1, 2011), para. 8.
73 Again, under REDD+. See Savaresi and Bouwer, supra note 4, section 3(a).
74 Paris Agreement, Preamble.
75 Duyck, supra note 71, 207.
76 Alan Boyle, ‘Climate Change, the Paris Agreement and Human Rights’, 67 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 759 (2018), 769–70.
77 Duyck, supra note 71.
78 Paris Agreement, Article 12.
79 Annalisa Savaresi and Joanne Scott, ‘Implementing the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the 
Global Human Rights Regime’, 9 Climate Law 159 (2019).
80 fccc/pa/cma/2018/3/Add.2 (2018).
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and without any reference to rights, justice, or equity; also the parties to the pa 
bear human rights obligations through international law in any event.81 Some 
provisions in the Rulebook could be read as supportive of the inclusion of 
human-rights based protections, including benefit-sharing; for example, it reit-
erates the recognition that the implementation of climate responses (which 
would include projects funded with climate finance) can have an impact, not-
ing that ‘Parties may be affected not only by climate change but also by the 
impacts of the measures taken in response to it’.82 This entails that climate 
change responses must not exacerbate existing inequalities or be contrary to 
existing human rights protections. The Rulebook establishes a forum on the 
impact of climate responses.83 The modalities and procedures of the forum 
include the promotion of ‘action to minimize the adverse impacts and max-
imize the positive impacts of the implementation of response measures’,84 
which surely implies proactive safeguards to ensure fair distribution of the 
advantages and disadvantages of climate responses.
Finally, although not specific to the Rulebook, there is improved recog-
nition among unfccc parties of the role of indigenous people and local 
communities. A Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform was 
created at cop 23 to strengthen the knowledge, practices, and efforts of iplc 
in responding to climate change. It emphasizes the sharing and strength-
ening of knowledge and the enhancement of engagement in the overall 
unfccc process.85 The need to engage with and seek the contribution of 
iplc in the formulation and implementation of mitigation action as well as 
national adaptation plans, and to seek their participation in relation to adap-
tation planning, is expressly recognized.86 While this inclusion emphasizes 
the importance of the broader contribution that iplc can make in relation to 
climate change, the strengthening of their status and the specific emphasis 
on their involvement needing to be ‘in accordance with international law’ 
reflect the importance indigenous people’s rights and interests in the climate 
regime. This could be read as extending entitlements of benefit-sharing to 
climate responses.
81 Duyck, supra note 71.
82 Decision 7/cp.24, preambular paragraphs. For background, see Chan, supra note 40.
83 Decision 7/CMA.1.
84 Annex to Decision 7/CMA.1, para. 1(f).
85 Decision 2/CP.23, Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, fccc/cp/2017/11/
Add.1 (2017), preamble and para. 6(c).
86 Decision 8/CP.24, Article 12; Decision 9/CP.24, Article 8.
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3 Climate Finance
This section will discuss climate finance, before going on to explore how 
benefit-sharing arrangements have been actualized by the ‘climate funds’.
3.1 Climate Finance – What Is It?
This first subsection seeks to confirm what climate finance is and can be used 
for, which is helpful for understanding what follows. Climate finance can 
cover the costs and risks of climate mitigation and adaptation actions, ensur-
ing low-carbon development as well as improved resilience and adaptation 
measures.87 It can be used to support climate-mitigation projects, specifically 
the development of low-carbon and renewable energy technologies.88 It can 
also be used to support the implementation of mitigation policies, including 
incentives such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs, or tax breaks,89 the supply of tech-
nologies, or the costs of removing barriers to technology introduction. This 
includes institutional and regulatory barriers, behavioural and educational 
impediments, and problems of capacity and readiness to receive.90 Climate 
finance can support capacity-building and technical assistance, and is a pre-
requisite to full participation in the Paris Agreement, for instance in compiling 
ndc s and complying with the treaty’s transparency processes.91
Understanding what climate finance does and how it does it also requires 
an understanding of the processes through which climate finance is ‘delivered’ 
through climate funds. When I refer to ‘climate funds’ below, I am referring 
to the treaty climate funds. In this article’s context, they are a small group of 
intermediary bodies to the climate regime, established under the unfccc and 
Kyoto Protocol, and, now, the Paris Agreement. The Global Environmental 
Facility is an independent multilateral financial institution that provides 
grants to developing countries for projects related to climate change and 
other environmental issues such as land restoration and pollution control. 
It is the long-standing operating entity of the Financial Mechanism of the 
87 Although adaptation measures continue to be underfunded: unfccc scf, supra note 1.
88 Søren Lütken, Financial Engineering of Climate Investment in Developing Countries (Anthem 
Press, 2014), Chapter 1.
89 Ibid., 59–61.
90 On the barriers to technology transfer, see Kim Bouwer, ‘Insights for Climate Technology 
Transfer from International Environmental and Human Rights Law’, 23 Journal of Intellectual 
Property Rights 7 (2018).
91 See, for instance, Paris Agreement, Article 13.14.
92 The Financial Mechanism was created under unfccc, Article 11, and the gef of the UN 
Environment Programme and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
bouwer
Climate Law 11 (2021) 1-44Downloaded from Brill.com05/07/2021 10:21:20AM
via University of Exeter
19
unfccc,92 with two climate funds, the Special Climate Change Fund and the 
Least Developed Countries Fund.93 The Adaptation Fund (af) was established 
under the Kyoto Protocol to finance adaptation programmes and projects in 
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change.94 At the 2018 cop it was included as a funding mechanism 
to serve the Paris Agreement.95 The Green Climate Fund was established at 
the 2010 cop with the goal of channelling finance to developing countries for 
policies, programmes, and projects on mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change;96 it was subsequently operationalized at the 2014 cop.
However, these are not the only, or only  public, finance institutions in cli-
mate finance. Nevertheless, the climate funds are the logical place to start an 
enquiry of this nature,97 not least because they operate within the climate 
regime and some elements in their constitutional documents recognize the 
need for benefit-sharing, as detailed below. Other public institutions such 
as development banks establish climate funds or otherwise deploy climate 
finance. For instance, the World Bank hosts a number of multilateral invest-
ment funds, including the Climate Investment Funds and the Clean Technology 
Fund.98 Private institutional investors, such as pension funds or insurance 
companies, which already provide a significant proportion of donor finance 
both domestically and internationally, may also have their own climate fund-
ing architecture.99 The contribution of private finance and private institutions 
is relevant to this study insofar as they are involved in the provision of finance 
in conjunction with multilateral climate funds.
was restructured and entrusted with its operation under unfccc, Article 21.3. See Richard 
B. Stewart, Bryce Rudyk, and Kiri Mattes, ‘Governing a Fragmented Climate Finance Regime’, 
in Hassane Cissé, Daniel D. Bradlow, and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), The World Bank Legal 
Review: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (The World Bank, 
2011), 380.
93 Decision 7/CP.7, The Marrakesh Accords (fccc/cp/2001/13/Add1).
94 Ibid., Decision 10/CP.10.
95 Decision 13/CMA.1, para. 1.
96 Decision 1/CP.16, para. 102. The gcf is also an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism 
under unfccc, Article 11.
97 My motivation for this approach is mostly practical, but this is consistent with a principled 
approach to climate finance as treaty finance; see Alexander Zahar, Climate Change Finance 
and International Law (Routledge, 2016), Chapter 1.
98 Stewart, supra note 92, 372–8.
99 Barbara Buchner, Padraig Oliver, Xueying Wang, Cameron Carswell, Chavi Meattle, and 
Federico Mazza, ‘Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2017: Climate Investment 
Analysis’, <https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate- 
finance-2017/>.
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A modest amount of project climate finance is provided directly, in the form 
of grants.100 Some public bodies provide grants or subsidies to support climate 
actions, covering the ‘incremental costs’ (explained below) incurred due to 
low-carbon choices. Grant funding could include cash transfers or the provi-
sion of some other kind of ‘free’ support. This can include direct payments 
made or channelled through climate funds, or direct support from climate 
funds.
Other climate-finance instruments provide support for the risk involved in 
climate investments. For instance, instead of subsidizing a loan, an institution 
could provide a guarantee or surety against default by the loan recipient, thus 
maintaining finance flows despite what might otherwise be a prohibitive risk. 
Climate funds or private investors can also ameliorate risk to investors by sup-
porting project-financing systems,101 or can play a leveraging or aggregation 
function which ameliorates risk for private investors.102 This can involve port-
folio-based engagement rather than the direct funding of specific projects; for 
instance, by creating portfolios for investors, development banks and climate 
funds can make investment packages attractive by ensuring an acceptable aggre-
gate level of risk in an investment portfolio. Through this process of facilitating 
risk-spreading through portfolios, development banks and climate funds can lev-
erage private capital to ensure investment is provided for key projects.103
Climate finance is most commonly provided through a range of financial 
instruments that enhance investment possibilities or make financing availa-
ble. In this sense, climate finance is predominantly about facilitation, rather 
than donation. A variety of methods or financial instruments encourage new, 
expanded, or continuing flows of private finance, which is then used to pro-
vide ‘climate finance’ to fund projects and initiatives in receiving countries.104 
Where private finance is involved, public finance may be used to make the 
investment environment more palatable for investors. A significant portion 
of finance is provided in form of concessional loans,105 ‘blending’ finance in 
100 Ibid., Table 1. This covers intrastate payments to individuals or organizations, but grant 
payments can be made interstate as well.
101 Baker, supra note 62.
102 Lütken, supra note 88, Chapter 5.
103 Cassie Flynn, Blending Climate Finance Through National Climate Funds (undp, 2011).
104 Murray Ward, Innovative Climate Finance: Examples from the UNEP Bilateral Finance 
Institutions Climate Change Working Group (unep, 2011).
105 Susanne Olbrisch, Erik Haites, Matthew Savage, Pradeep Dadhich, and Manish Kumar 
Shrivastana, ‘Estimates of Incremental Investment for, and Cost of, Mitigation Measures 
in Developing Countries’, in Erik Haites (ed.), International Climate Finance (Routledge, 
2013).
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circumstances where repaying the loan at market rates of interest might other-
wise make the project infeasible.106 They can be blended with other financial 
instruments – for instance, it is a common practice in climate finance to blend 
climate funds’ low-cost loans with commercial financing from Development 
Finance Institutions.107
The detail offered here highlights the complexity and sophistication of 
many of the arrangements, but it also sheds light on the methodological and 
technical complications involved in tracking flows of finance. For instance, 
loans need to be repaid, and this does not always result in a net flow of finance 
from developed to developing countries. Zhang explains:
if loans and other profit-driven financial instruments are considered to 
be climate finance, there will be cases where the flows of climate finance, 
as reported, [are] in line with the rules (i.e. it is from developed to devel-
oping countries), but in reality the net transfer is in the other direction 
(e.g. where developing countries have to pay back the loans with interest 
to developed countries).108
The lack of a formal definition of climate finance means that it is difficult to 
delimit the scope of climate finance and determine how it should be mon-
itored. Exercises on monitoring, verification, and reporting of finance flows 
are beset with uncertain working practices, gaps and uncertainty in data, and 
variable accounting practices. These issues are important, not least because 
they determine flows and usage of climate finance,109 but they need not be 
addressed in this article, which examines the work of the treaty climate funds.
3.2 Climate Finance in the Climate Regime
Climate finance is important for making progress towards the unfccc objec-
tives and the pa goals. The unfccc requires Annex ii parties to provide ‘new 
and additional’ financial resources to support developing countries with the 
‘full agreed incremental costs’ of meeting their obligations under the treaty.110 
106 Lütken, supra note 88.
107 Flynn, supra note 103.
108 Hao Zhang, ‘Implementing Provisions on Climate Finance Under the Paris Agreement’, 9 
Climate Law 21 (2019), 35.
109 Romain Weikmans and J. Timmons Roberts, ‘The International Climate Finance 
Accounting Muddle: Is There Hope on the Horizon?’, 11 Climate and Development 97 (2019).
110 unfccc, Article 4.3: ‘shall provide’.
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Elsewhere, climate finance is limited to ‘this difference in cost’.111 Accordingly, 
theoretically, climate finance refers to the resources provided to meet the 
difference in cost between a traditional development pathway and ‘techno-
logically advanced, less globally harmful’ development,112 although of course 
this distinction is not always easy to make. The provision of climate finance 
as an obligation is reiterated under the pa, as one of the few obligations that 
is framed as an imperative.113 The pa requires ‘finance flows consistent with a 
pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient develop-
ment’.114 Notions of progression are emphasized, and the provision of finance 
is subject to the transparency and compliance mechanisms that seek to hold 
parties accountable in international climate governance.115
Climate finance was a core consideration at the 2018 cop, and the need for 
clarity on predictability of flows, funding criteria, additionality, and the useful-
ness of climate finance in capacity-building and supporting necessary transi-
tions are reflected in the operational paragraphs of the relevant decisions.116 
As explained above, the Rulebook clarifies the information that needs to be 
provided by parties for full transparency on climate finance, and the modal-
ities, procedures, and guidelines that specify in detail how this information 
should be presented.117
The focus on equity in the Rulebook relates predominantly to burden-sharing, 
as for instance in the requirement that a party must justify in its ndc how its 
ndc ‘is fair and ambitious, in the light of its national circumstances, and how 
it contributes towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in 
its Article 2’.118 But there is very little in the Rulebook that enables or supports 
111 Zahar, supra note 97. He illustrates a conundrum: a program delivering only global 
environmental benefits but no local benefits would show no difference between total and 
incremental costs, because the hosting country receives no benefits. Conversely, where 
there are only local, but no global, environmental benefits, no incremental costs are 
incurred and the project has no entitlement to climate finance.
112 Ibid., Chapter 1.
113 Paris Agreement, Article 9.1, states that ‘Developed country Parties shall provide financial 
resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and 
adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention’. Other 
parties are ‘encouraged’ to (continue to) provide support ‘voluntarily’, recognizing the 
contribution already made by emerging market states: ibid., Article 9.2.
114 Paris Agreement, Article 2.1(c).
115 Ibid., Articles 9.5–9.7.
116 Decision 12/CMA.1, Annex. Space and this article’s purpose does not permit a full 
discussion of all the Rulebook provisions relating to climate finance; but see Zhang, supra 
note 108.
117 In accordance with Paris Agreement, Articles 9.5, 13.9, and 13.10, and the Paris Rulebook, 
Decision 12/CMA.1 and Decision 18/CMA.1.
118 Decision 4/CMA.1, para. 9.
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direct evaluation from an operational perspective of the equity and justice in 
the provision of climate finance, and the climate funds have no corresponding 
transparency provisions.119 Accordingly, as argued above, there exists a norm 
or emerging norm of benefit-sharing under which states have obligations in 
international law, although the contours of this norm are somewhat fuzzy. The 
climate funds themselves have adopted voluntary provisions on benefit-shar-
ing, but as will be discussed below, their concept of benefit-sharing is quite 
empty, which results in incoherence. Of course, the pa does encourage trans-
parency and accountability between parties, but that is intended to ensure 
trust and co-operation among them to promote continued and progressive 
ambition.120 In any event, it seems unlikely that the implementation mech-
anisms of the pa could be effectively used to monitor other states’ domestic 
compliance with human rights, the decisions of intermediary bodies, or equity 
considerations, in the context of the provision and receipt of climate finance.
3.3 Benefit-Sharing and Climate Finance
As outlined above, benefit-sharing is not a formal obligation in the interna-
tional climate regime, although it has been used extensively in mechanisms 
that fall under it or are associated with it.121 It is employed in climate-relevant 
projects in domestic and other contexts, for instance in relation to renewable 
energy projects.122 There is, in addition, oblique reference to climate finance or 
development finance in the Framework Principles, discussed in Section 2.123 
FP13 requires the co-operation of states ‘to establish, maintain and enforce 
effective international legal frameworks in order to prevent, reduce and rem-
edy transboundary and global environmental harm that interferes with the full 
enjoyment of human rights’. It also requires compliance with human rights 
obligations in the context of international financial mechanisms. The com-
mentary to the principle states:
International financial institutions, as well as State agencies that provide 
international assistance, should adopt and implement environmental 
and social safeguards that are consistent with human rights obligations, 
119 Savaresi and Scott, supra note 79.
120 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretive 
Possibilities and Underlying Politics’, 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 493 
(2016), 502–5.
121 Most notably REDD+; see Chapman, Wilder, and Miller, supra note 10.
122 See Maria Lee, Chiara Armeni, Javier de Cendra, Sarah Chaytor, Simon Lock, Mark 
Maslin, Catherine Redgwell, and Yvonne Rydin, ‘Public Participation and Climate Change 
Infrastructure’, 23 Journal of Environmental Law 33 (2013).
123 Knox, supra note 23.
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including by: (a) requiring the environmental and social assessment of 
every proposed project and programme; (b) providing for effective pub-
lic participation; (c) providing for effective procedures to enable those 
who may be harmed to pursue remedies; (d) requiring legal and institu-
tional protections against environmental and social risks; and (e) includ-
ing specific protections for indigenous peoples and those in vulnerable 
situations.124
While this elaboration does not expressly require benefit-sharing, it empha-
sizes the importance of substantive and procedural safeguards in international 
financing. The specific reference to the protections for ip could be interpreted 
to include all the protections of FP15, which, as noted in Section 2, include 
benefit-sharing. More broadly, compliance with these requirements must be 
interpreted to require not only appropriate benefit-sharing arrangements, for 
instance environmental and social assessments, but also that these are sub-
stantively fair and equitable, for instance through public participation.
3.4 Benefit-Sharing Obligations in the Climate Funds
The treaty ‘climate funds’ – the Global Environmental Facility-operated cli-
mate funds (the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed 
Countries Fund), the Adaptation Fund, and the Green Climate Fund – all 
incorporate benefit-sharing requirements in their founding documents. Each 
fund has also developed policies and guidance to maintain standards and 
avoid environmental and social risks and impacts in the implementation of 
their projects or policies. Those of the gef and the af include benefit-sharing 
requirements, while those of the gcf could be understood to have them.125 
The gef, as of 2019, has an environmental and social policy (esp) that applies 
to the gef Secretariat and all ‘project agencies’.126 It sets out a series of min-
imum standards in relation to environmental and social risks and impacts 
in all new (and in some in-progress) projects and programs, and specifies a 
tiered risk-mitigation approach (or mitigation hierarchy).127 The esp also sets 
124 Ibid., para. 39.
125 This discussion relates to the current and most recent iterations of these policies. For a 
discussion of benefit-sharing provisions under the earlier policies, see Savaresi, supra note 
2, 17–19.
126 gef, ‘Environmental and Social Safeguard Standards (Council Document gef/C.55/07/
Rev.01)’, 13 June 2019, <www.thegef.org/documents/environmental-and-social-safeguard-
standards>, 12.
127 Ibid., Minimum Standard (ms) 1, para. 4(c); ms 3, para. 8(b); ms 5, para. 11(a)-(j).
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out minimum standards for benefit-sharing for ip affected by fund activities. 
This is supplemented by the gef’s Principles and Guidance for engaging with 
Indigenous Peoples (pgip)128 and Stakeholders.129 Stakeholders are broadly 
defined to include various categories of potentially affected people, including 
iplc, even though the benefit-sharing provisions only relate to ip. The pgip 
frames environmental and social protections broadly, linking them to human 
rights protection, full respect for the dignity of indigenous communities, and 
the importance of protecting ip from the effects of development.130 The pgip 
also links benefit-sharing to respect for the traditional knowledge, innovations, 
and practices of ip, recognizing that traditional knowledge serves as a source 
of information in the utilization of genetic resources,131 and ‘recognising and 
respecting’ the existing guidance on traditional knowledge and sharing of tra-
ditional resources.132 It establishes a series of ‘minimum standards’ in relation 
to the procedural safeguards, which while addressing environmental justice 
more generally, are components of, and necessary for, properly implementing 
and administering benefit-sharing arrangements.133 This of course includes 
participation, which in environmental decision-making is a substantive as 
well as procedural right.134 This is explored further in Section 4, but, for now, 
the concept and processes of participation are both necessary to secure other 
rights and important because of their capacity to inform other, substantive ele-
ments, such as consent, and the ongoing need for dialogue and recognition.
The af’s revised esp aims to bring its practices in line with the social and 
environmental safeguards used by ‘other leading financing institutions active 
in environment and development financing’, the domestic laws of donor and 
recipient countries, and the existing policies and management systems of 
128 gef, ‘Principles and Guidelines for Engagement with Indigenous Peoples (Council 
Document gef/C.42/Inf.03/Rev.1)’, 21 October 2012, <www.thegef.org/documents/
indigenous-peoples>.
129 gef, ‘Guidelines on the Implementation of the Policy on Stakeholder Engagement 
(Council Document gef/C.55/Inf.08)’, 21 November 2018, <www.thegef.org/council-
meeting-documents/guidelines-implementation-policy-stakeholder-engagement>, 
Definitions.
130 See e.g. gef, supra note 128, para. 30(a).
131 Ibid., para. 40(d).
132 Ibid., para. 40(e), ‘including … the Akwe: Kon guidelines, the Bonn Guidelines and the 
Nagoya Protocol [mentioned in the previous and subsequent sections of this paragraph, 
and encouraging] the use of the guidance contained in these documents in gef-financed 
projects, as appropriate’.
133 gef, supra note 127, 16–18.
134 Olawuyi, supra note 14, 120f.
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many of their implementing entities.135 Although not particularly detailed, the 
af’s approach to benefit-sharing is the most progressive and best-developed. 
It establishes a risk-based screening for the social and environmental risks of 
proposed initiatives that could be avoided, minimized, or mitigated by the af 
or its implementing entities.136 It requires that projects and programmes it 
supports ‘shall provide fair and equitable access to benefits in a manner that is 
inclusive and does not impede access to basic health services, clean water and 
sanitation, energy, education, housing, safe and decent working conditions, 
and land rights, [and] should not exacerbate existing inequities, particularly 
with respect to marginalized or vulnerable groups’,137 broadly framed.138 The 
implementation guidelines focus on equity and fairness, specifying that ‘pro-
ject/programme benefits’ must be subject to a fair process and be fairly and 
impartially accessible.139
In contrast, the af’s guidance relating to ip does not mention benefit-sharing 
(and, given the esp, does not need to), requiring projects and programmes to be 
consistent with international protection of ip,140 and emphasizing the impor-
tance of free, prior, and informed consent (fpic) throughout.141 Programmes 
and policies are also required to respect and promote international human 
rights,142 which are to form ‘an explicit part of consultations with stakeholders 
during the identification and formulation of the project/programme’.143 The 
135 af, ‘Environmental and Social Policy (Amended in March 2016, Approved in November 
2013)’, March 2016, <www.adaptation-fund.org/document/environmental-and-social-
policy-approved-in-november-2013/>, paras 2, 4, 6.
136 Ibid., section ‘D. Environmental and Social Policy Delivery Process’.
137 Ibid., subsection ‘B. Environmental and Social Principles’, ‘13. Access and Equity’. In the 
af, ‘Guidance Document for Implementing Entities on Compliance with the Adaptation 
Fund Environmental and Social Policy’, <www.adaptation-fund.org/document/guidance-
document-implementing-entities-compliance-adaptation-fund-environmental-social-
policy/>, 6, it is acknowledged that this principle might not always apply.
138 Ibid, subsection ‘B. Environmental and Social Principles’, ‘14. Marginalized and 
Vulnerable Groups’. ‘Projects/programmes supported by the Fund shall avoid imposing 
any disproportionate adverse impacts on marginalized and vulnerable groups including 
children, women and girls, the elderly, indigenous people, tribal groups, displaced people, 
refugees, people living with disabilities, and people living with hiv/aids. In screening 
any proposed project/programme, the implementing entities shall assess and consider 
particular impacts on marginalized and vulnerable groups.’
139 af, supra note 137, 6.
140 However, the host country’s ratification status of ilo Convention 169 may be considered: 
ibid., 13.
141 Ibid., 11–12.
142 af, supra note 135, subsection ‘B. Environmental and Social Principles’, ‘15. Human Rights’.
143 af, supra note 137, 8.
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guidance states that compliance with the udhr will be monitored, even when 
the host country is not a signatory to other core human rights treaties.144 In 
contrast, it has fairly sparse procedural protections. It requires early identifica-
tion of stakeholders and open public consultation;145 it establishes accounta-
bility mechanisms, which include a monitoring and reporting process;146 and 
it establishes a grievance mechanism.147
The gcf’s revised policy for social and environmental safeguards seeks to 
‘effectively and equitably manage environmental and social risks and impacts, 
and improve outcomes of all gcf-financed activities’,148 by ‘integrating’ sus-
tainability into fund activities.149 The policy applies to all fund activities 
and financial instruments,150 and states a commitment to avoid or mitigate 
‘adverse impacts to people or environment’,151 ‘enhance equitable access to 
development benefits’,152 give ‘due consideration to vulnerable and marginal-
ised populations, groups, and individuals, local communities, indigenous peo-
ples, and other marginalized groups of people and individuals that are affected 
or potentially affected by gcf-financed activities’,153 and be consistent with 
international human rights standards.154
The gcf policy speaks to the need for both common standards and 
particularity. It speaks to consistency and alignment with ‘international 
best practices and applicable standards’,155 as well as with other safe-
guards established in the climate regime.156 It also requires harmonization 
between its own decisions and practices to ensure ‘a common approach’.157 
Like the gef, it establishes a tiered approach to risk based on ‘mitigation 
144 Ibid., 9.
145 af, supra note 135, subsection ‘D. Environmental and Social Policy Delivery Process’, ‘33. 
Public Disclosure and Consultation’.
146 Ibid., subsection ‘D. Environmental and Social Policy Delivery Process’, ‘32. Monitoring, 
Reporting, and Evaluation’.
147 A brief discussion may be found in af, supra note 137, 21.
148 gcf, Environmental and Social Policy (Board Decision B.19/10), 2018, <www.greenclimate.
fund/documents/environmental-social-policy>, para. 3.
149 Ibid., para. 8(a).
150 Ibid., para. 5; including jointly implemented projects: see para. 6.
151 Ibid., para. 3(a).
152 Ibid., para. 3(b).
153 Ibid., para. 3(c).
154 Ibid., para. 8(q).
155 Ibid., para. 8(i).
156 Specifically REDD+, ibid., para. 8(n).
157 Ibid., para. 8(l). ‘gcf will promote the harmonized application of environmental and 
social safeguards to reduce multiple and overlapping requirements for activities through 
the development of common approach that considers the requirements of other 
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hierarchy’,158 recognizing ‘a wide range of entities, which can differ accord-
ing to the scope and nature of the activities of the entities, and their capac-
ity to manage environmental and social risks and impacts’.159 The provisions 
that could be read to require benefit-sharing are included in the principle 
relating to the treatment of ip:
All gcf-financed activities will avoid adverse impacts on indigenous peo-
ples, and when avoidance is not possible, will minimize, mitigate and/or 
compensate appropriately and equitably for such impacts, in a consistent 
way and improve outcomes over time; promote benefits and opportuni-
ties; and respect and preserve indigenous culture, including the indige-
nous peoples’ rights to lands, territories, resources, knowledge systems, 
and traditional livelihoods and practices. All gcf-financed activities will 
support the full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and 
recognize their contribution to fulfilling the gcf mandate throughout 
the entire life cycle of the activities.160
While this passage does not specifically require benefit-sharing, it can be read 
to do so. As will be explored more fully in the next section, many of the pro-
visions of the gcf policy require the same things as benefit-sharing arrange-
ments that are consistent with international standards, as well as ‘free, prior 
and informed consent’ and ongoing engagement throughout the life of the 
project.161 The quoted passage speaks to the need for ‘full and effective’ partici-
pation and for distinguishing between benefits and compensation (the rectifi-
cation of harm or loss of rights).
More specific provision is made for the procedural aspects of environmen-
tal and social assessment. The gcf assumes responsibility for the full disclo-
sure of information, including that related to the social and environmental 
safeguards.162 It requires that ‘stakeholders’ are consulted in matters in which 
they are affected,163 with additional requirements in relation to ip, ‘during the 
co-financing institutions while providing the highest level of environmental and social 
protection required among the parties, with at least the level of protection by gcf being 
required.’
158 Ibid., para. 8(f).
159 Ibid., para. 8(d).
160 Ibid., para. 8(p).
161 Also in ibid., para. 12(b).
162 Ibid., para. 12(a) and 61–6.
163 Ibid., paras 12(b), 18, and 67–72.
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design and implementation of the activities’164 and the formulation of envi-
ronmental and social management plans.165 Extensive provision is made for 
monitoring and reporting.166 The esp also establishes a grievance procedure 
and Independent Redress Mechanism (irm),167 and requires that accredited 
entities have complementary procedures and facilitate access to the irm.168 
The irm aims to provide redress in cases of adverse impacts brought about 
‘through the failure of the project or programme funded by the Fund to imple-
ment the Fund’s operational policies and procedures, including environmen-
tal and social safeguards’.169
From the above, it is hard to derive a clear picture of what benefit-sharing 
is in the climate funds, to whom it should apply, and in what circumstances. (I 
will return to this point in Section 4.1.) Procedurally, all the esp s include provi-
sions for the governance and oversight of social and environmental safeguards, 
including early stakeholder identification, ongoing participation, and free, 
prior, and informed consent, all of which are found in the procedural elements 
of benefit-sharing arrangements. However, they are framed slightly differently, 
and only one esp (the gcf’s) includes an accountability mechanism. But per-
haps more importantly there is little consistency on the substantive aspects of 
benefit-sharing. For instance, the gcf and af both require consistency with 
international human rights standards, but, as outlined earlier, benefit-sharing 
in human rights law is conceptually quite empty. This lack of clarity is reflected 
in how these arrangements are interpreted by the funds. For instance, an 
empirical analysis of af Board decisions found no obvious coherence in the 
approaches taken to vulnerability and benefit (i.e. project benefit) in decisions 
of the af Board.170 This would suggest that there is little consistency on what 
counts as a benefit in the variety of financing situations where benefit-sharing 
might arise. If there is no coherence within the af, it is unlikely that it exists 
across funding entities, or in other kinds of climate-related benefit-sharing, or 
in international norms in general.
Also, despite the ambitious inclusivity of most of the policies, specific 
provision is usually only made for ip, which is of course necessary, but 
164 Ibid., para. 12(b).
165 Ibid., para. 47.
166 Ibid., para. 56–60.
167 Ibid., para. 73–8.
168 Ibid., para. 12.
169 Decision B.06/09, Annex V, ‘Terms of Reference of the Independent Redress Mechanism’.
170 Elise Remling and Åsa Persson, ‘Who Is Adaptation for? Vulnerability and Adaptation 
Benefits in Proposals Approved by the unfccc Adaptation Fund’, 7 Climate and 
Development 16 (2015).
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falls short of the conceptualization of benefit-sharing in international law, 
which requires protection to extend to local communities. The policies also 
fall short of what seems to be usual practice in climate-related project ben-
efit-sharing, namely that communities local to, or affected by, a project are 
considered for benefit-sharing in some circumstances, even where they are 
not considered a traditional local community in the sense of the fp. The af 
acknowledges this implicitly, by including benefit-sharing as a general obli-
gation that is not specific to ip. But again, in both the af and gcf there is no 
real guidance as to the circumstances in which benefit-sharing is ‘triggered’. 
The policies seem to contemplate that they would be determined with early 
assessment, but do not specify what should be considered in the assess-
ment or how it should be conducted. This makes it difficult to imagine the 
accrediting entity identifying all opportunities and stakeholders in poten-
tial benefit-sharing arrangements. Conversely, the gef makes provision for 
benefit-sharing when projects are commercialized, but this is too narrow 
a framing compared to international standards, does not take sufficient 
account of the differences between the kinds of activities that arise in bio-
diversity protection and climate change (given the broad remit of the gef), 
and does not take account of the overlaps or disjunctions between climate 
benefits and community benefits, as will be explored in the next section.
In addition to the question of whether there is consistency and coherence in 
the way benefit-sharing arrangements are introduced, there is the question of 
whether benefit-sharing proposals are considered and then introduced in the 
circumstances in which they ‘should’ be. A comprehensive review of funding 
proposals to the af revealed that very few applications addressed the distri-
bution of benefits amongst beneficiaries.171 A scoping review of gcf docu-
ments suggests that benefit-distribution arrangements are not being proposed 
or sought in the vast majority of funding applications. The documents show 
that the gcf approved eleven new projects in 2017, and that the gcf Board 
took a number of key policy decisions to further strengthen the operations of 
the Fund and its support for high-quality climate finance initiatives.172 Very 
few project applications from 2017–2019 sought approval for benefit-sharing 
arrangements, whether in their project requests or esp reports. Benefit-
sharing is not necessary or appropriate in all circumstances, so the fact that 
171 Ibid., 28.
172 See <www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/38417/release_GCF_2017_B18.pdf/>. This 
review was conducted as part of the research for this article. I am grateful to Alphaeus 
Ngonga for his research assistance.
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benefit-sharing is not always mentioned is not indicative of anything necessar-
ily having gone wrong in gcf decision-making. But as mentioned above, there 
are no clearly defined triggers for benefit-sharing in climate finance, either in 
the funds’ guidance documents or anywhere else. As such, a determination of 
whether benefit-sharing arrangements are appropriate and needed is entirely 
discretionary and left to the accredited entity formulating the proposal. Thus, 
despite the references to international standards, it is difficult to see how deci-
sions on benefit-sharing could be consistent with them in the absence of more 
carefully formulated guidance.
4 Some Possibilities for a New Norm
From the previous sections it emerged that benefit-sharing as a concept and 
practice in climate finance requires further thought. This last section deals 
with important or undertheorized areas in benefit-sharing in climate finance. 
Its purpose is not to construct a norm but to suggest key areas where the devel-
opment of a norm or principles could occur. International norms and stand-
ards on benefit-sharing need to be considered and respected, but this must be 
done with an eye to existing practices in climate law and climate finance, and 
the particular nature and circumstances of the arrangements that develop in 
this context.
Accordingly, in this section I first refer back to the earlier discussion on 
the diversity of possible ‘climate finance’ projects and funding arrangements, 
which, when combined with the demanding particularities and context-spec-
ificity of benefit-sharing, can become messy. Next I look at some overarching 
issues relating to participation, community involvement, and representation, 
emphasizing their procedural necessity and substantive importance. Finally, 
I return to the substantive question of what benefits might mean in climate 
finance.
4.1 Benefit-Sharing in Climate Finance is Heterogeneous
Earlier in this article I summarized the many functions and delivery meth-
ods of climate finance, highlighting the inherent heterogeneity in the field – 
meaning differences in laws and practice, the likely benefits that might arise, 
the involvement of the stakeholders, and the way ongoing relationships are 
managed – a fact that makes the prescription of a universalized model of 
benefit-sharing difficult. For instance, small-scale renewable energy projects 
frequently employ benefit-sharing arrangements that are subject to domestic 
laws or policy guidelines but also to the choices and practices of particular 
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sub-industries or individual developers.173 This might be very different to, 
say, projects that aim to increase crop resilience in small-scale agriculture, 
which take place in an increasingly complex legal landscape of conflicting 
rights and policies.174 Different still might be international exchanges that 
seek to stimulate innovation and support capacity-building through long-
term technology-development initiatives.175 All such projects could be, and 
are, funded by climate finance, and could potentially be subject to bene-
fit-sharing arrangements;176 however, this raises questions about how ‘bene-
fits’ would be conceptualized in the context of such multifarious projects.177
To some extent the defining character of climate finance projects is the 
provision of finance; yet, as described above, the instruments and modalities 
of climate finance vary enormously, and finance provided through the funds 
varies between projects, with use being made of grants, subsidies, loans, or 
various forms of public-private ‘blended’ finance. This raises a question: Why 
consider climate finance at all, if approaches to benefit-sharing could be deter-
mined by the substantive regimes within which climate finance is delivered? 
The problem with this is that it would mean accepting significant diversity 
in arrangements between projects supported by the same fund, which chal-
lenges basic concepts of equity and fairness. At the very least, the adoption 
of clear minimum standards would promote consistency with international 
obligations created elsewhere, and would not prevent the adoption of distinct, 
more specific, or better protection, if this is required by ad hoc practice, an 
alternative international regime, or indeed the benefit-recipients themselves.
4.2 Starting Early with Assessment
The esp s and associated policies of all funds underline the importance of early 
assessment. All climate funds prescribe review of impacts or possible risks 
before approval is granted, and these procedural requirements can probably 
be generalized across project types. Much like eia, these environmental and 
social-risk assessments are a procedural requirement in environmental law, yet 
173 Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Rise of Community Energy from Grassroots to Mainstream: The 
Role of Law and Policy’, 31 Journal of Environmental Law 487 (2019).
174 Outlined in Elsa Tsioumani, ‘Beyond Access and Benefit-Sharing: Lessons from the Law 
and Governance of Agricultural Biodiversity’, 21 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 
106 (2018).
175 Bouwer, supra note 90; and David Ockwell and Rob Byrne, ‘Improving Technology Transfer 
through National Systems of Innovation: Climate Relevant Innovation-System Builders 
(crib s)’, 16 Climate Policy 836 (2016).
176 Savaresi and Bouwer, supra note 3, section 3(b).
177 But see, for instance, Bouwer, supra note 90, section 6.
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can also be seen as an ‘entryway into deeper, substantive legal understand-
ings of public participation … and wider concepts of rights and obligations in 
any legal system’.178 They are relevant to, but go beyond, considerations about 
benefit-sharing in projects. They identify project impacts and likely risks, and 
determine how these might be mitigated or controlled, or be subject to com-
pensation or other forms of reparative payments. As explored further below, 
the line between compensation and benefit-sharing is not always clear, and 
international standards require that these should be assessed according to dis-
tinct processes. The assessment stage is the time at which these distinctions 
should be made. But an assessment also makes (or should make) an early 
determination about who the stakeholders are in a project.
Special Rapporteur Knox has stipulated that wherever environmental and 
social assessment is done, it should be done as early as possible,179 and, in 
relation to iplc, it should be done in accordance with their own customs and 
traditions, as well as in accordance with the Guidelines established under the 
cbd.180 The Akwé: Kon Guidelines provide detailed and far-reaching require-
ments for social, environmental, and cultural impact assessments to be con-
ducted in circumstances where the rights or interests of ip are potentially 
affected.181 The Guidelines cover the conduct of meetings, including estab-
lishing mechanisms for the ongoing engagement of communities and the con-
duct and recording of meetings.182 They provide for indigenous communities’ 
involvement with the financial aspects of the project, including auditing and 
project oversight,183 thereby ensuring transparency of the financial invest-
ment and gains made in the project. They require states to provide support 
(legal, technical, financial, etc.) to ip to assist their engagement in these pro-
cesses. They also require the establishment of a review and appeal process.184 
References to these requirements are reflected, albeit inconsistently, in the 
funds’ esp s, which are certainly ‘front-loaded’ in terms of processes of risk 
assessment and identification of key stakeholders.
178 Natasha Affolder, ‘Contagious Environmental Lawmaking’, 31 Journal of Environmental 
Law 187 (2019), 190; see also Knox, supra note 23, para. 25.
179 Knox, supra note 23, para. 20.
180 Ibid., paras 43 and 50. This approach was endorsed by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in relation to indigenous people’s rights in relation to extractive activities taking 
place on their land; see discussion in Morgera, supra note 34.
181 cbd Dec vii.16 UN Doc unep/cbd/cop/dec/vii/16 Annex F, Section iv.
182 Ibid., paras 14–17.
183 Ibid., para. 18.
184 Ibid., para. 23.
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This early procedural process is key to the ‘predetermination’ of the agenda, 
and gets to frame the boundaries of risk and impact assessments, but also 
determines whether benefit-sharing arrangements are ‘triggered’ or indicated 
at the project-proposal stage.185 If the initial assessment works well, it sets the 
stage for the future relationship, for what could be a decades-long project, and 
to some extent shapes all the criteria discussed below – how the participatory 
processes function, who the beneficiaries are, how project benefits are under-
stood, etc.
This having been said, the issues underlying these assessments can be seen 
as a subcategory of benefit-sharing, both as a procedural entry into proper 
arrangements and as a synecdoche for the tensions between particularity 
and universality that were discussed earlier in the article. As noted, eia is an 
existing or emerging norm in international environmental law, yet a transna-
tional review of the effectiveness of eia reveals mixed results.186 If esp s can 
be seen as a category of eia, then they need to be approached with this in 
mind. It is not clear that eia works in all contexts; for instance, where national 
laws or standards do not support robust evaluations or measures of risk, or 
where failures in implementation come about due to subversive interests or 
contrary incentives.187 This is particularly problematic for the current study, as 
most of the studies reflecting shortcomings come from Global South countries 
that would (or should) be the targeted recipients of climate finance.188 Yet it 
is difficult to imagine an alternative – simply not bothering with assessment 
processes is certainly not a solution. It is difficult to know how to tackle the 
complex reasons why eia processes frequently fall short in the Global South 
context.
4.3 The Importance of Participation
The right to participation in environmental decision-making is a substantive 
as well as procedural right.189 The concept and processes of participation in 
environmental law have been well developed in the academic literature.190 
Participation is considered necessary to secure the public accountability 
and legitimacy of any environmental project or programme. The Framework 
Principles, discussed above, emphasize the importance of public participation, 
185 Caine and Krogman, supra note 52, 82.
186 Affolder, supra note 178.
187 Ibid., section 2.
188 Ibid., and sources cited therein.
189 Olawuyi, supra note 14, 120f.
190 Lee, et al., supra note 122.
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which must be open to everyone, occur early in any process or project, and be 
carried out with full and complete information as to the intended project, pos-
sible decisions, and rights of the parties in that context.191
Benefit-sharing is inherently linked to participation because the former 
requires the ongoing balancing of rights and interests in a project. The impor-
tance of participation in benefit-sharing in the climate regime is implicitly 
acknowledged in the Cancun safeguards, which seek to avoid negative out-
comes or results from the implementation of climate projects in forests, calling 
for ‘full and effective participation’.192 A lack of participation or loss of access 
to salient information about the design and process of carbon projects has 
been identified as a severe shortcoming.193
In essence this requirement informs all other aspects of benefit-sharing 
arrangements, in that participatory processes determine the quality of the rela-
tionships that underlie established arrangements. Participation plays a role in 
shaping the engagement and external face of communities, as the engagement 
and dialogue within communities governs the internal legitimacy of commu-
nity protocols and embodies the communities’ approach to the project and 
their engagement with it.194 These are of crucial importance, for in order for 
the community to ‘participate’ in any benefit-sharing arrangements, the repre-
sentatives must fulfil their role legitimately. But participation, or elements of 
what defines an adequate participatory processes, also underpin and inform 
other essential aspects of benefit-sharing. Participatory processes determine 
the quality and effectiveness of channels of communication between project 
partners (which could include any range of actors, such as climate funds, pro-
ject developers, or local or national governments) and the benefit recipients, 
and are relevant at all stages of the project; at initiation, identification of stake-
holders, risk assessment, project management, and (if relevant) accountability 
and redress processes. As discussed above, all climate-fund esp s and associ-
ated documents require processes that are either constitutive of, or depend on, 
participation for their proper actualization.
This raises all sorts of questions as to whether benefit-sharing arrange-
ments can create the basis for the ongoing relationships required for substan-
tive participation in projects funded by climate finance, and indeed whether 
benefit ‘recipients’ could have adequate participatory power through exist-
ing structures to enforce and maintain benefit-sharing arrangements. Where 
191 Knox, supra note 23, Principle 15 and commentary.
192 Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements, Appendix 1.1(d).
193 Olawuyi, supra note 14, 111f.
194 Parks and Morgera, supra note 67, 340.
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participatory processes are examined in other contexts, and where engage-
ment in participation is done without proper reflection and engagement, the 
outcomes tend to be less than constructive: reinforcing existing power imbal-
ances195 or alienating stakeholders from the initiatives in which, or for which, 
their consent (or involvement) is sought196 or frustrating all parties due to the 
perceived futility of engaging in ‘hollow’ bureaucratic exercises with little real 
scope for consensus or dialogue.197 These ongoing processes should include a 
‘deliberative, consensus-based public dialogue aimed at reaching better-quality 
decisions through the value of individual rationalities’.198 This needs to be 
more than participation with the mere aim of securing consent or ‘public 
acceptance’ – a process in which discussion aims only to secure acceptance or 
compliance.199
4.4 Voice and Recognition
Closely associated with these substantive concepts of participation is the con-
cept of participants’ voice and recognition. A sense of inclusion accrues by 
virtue of a recognition of preference in relation to monetary or other benefits 
in all benefit-sharing arrangements. Recognition is a subject but also a precon-
dition for other forms of justice,200 and indeed social recognition is included 
as a non-monetary benefit in the ‘menu’ of benefits annexed to the Nagoya 
Protocol.201 The recipients’ voice and priorities are important when it comes 
to how the benefits are framed, which further underlines the importance of 
participation. As Schlosberg explains:
If you are not recognized you do not participate; if you do not participate 
you are not recognized. In this respect justice must focus on the political 
195 Maria Lee and Carolyn Abbot, ‘The Usual Suspects? Public Participation Under the Aarhus 
Convention’, 66 The Modern Law Review 80 (2003).
196 Margherita Pieraccini, ‘Rethinking Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: 
Epistemologies of Marine Conservation in South-East England’, 27 Journal of Environmental 
Law 45 (2015).
197 Maria Lee, et al., supra note 122. See also Lucy Natarajan, Yvonne Rydin, Simon Lock, and 
Maria Lee, ‘Navigating the Participatory Processes of Renewable Energy Infrastructure 
Regulation: A “Local Participant Perspective” on the nsip s Regime in England and Wales’, 
114 Energy Policy 201 (2018).
198 Armeni, supra note 67, 437.
199 Ibid.
200 Saskia Vermeylen and Gordon Walker, ‘Environmental Justice, Values and Biological 
Diversity: The San and the Hoodia Benefit Sharing Agreement’, in JoAnn Carmin and 
Julian Agyeman (eds), Environmental Inequalities Beyond Borders: Local Perspectives on 
Global Injustices (mit Press, 2011), 108; Parks, supra note 60, Chapter 4.
201 Nagoya Protocol, Annex 2(p).
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process as a way to address both the inequitable distribution of social 
goods and the conditions undermining social recognition.202
This raises all sorts of questions about perspective, worldview, and knowledge 
when it comes to the determination of benefits accruing from climate finance 
projects and the framework through which these should be delivered. They 
need to be designed to suit recipients’ particular needs and priorities. This is 
not an argument against systematization and universalization of these norms, 
and it certainly raises no conflict with the requirement that full information 
about all aspects of the proposed project and associated rights be provided. 
The provision of full information and the preservation of minimum standards 
and best practices should preserve a space for recipient voices; this is not the 
same as the imposition of pre-determined benefits packages.
4.5 Community/Benefit Recipients
Benefit-sharing in climate finance raises new questions about actors and par-
ticipants, and in particular about who the benefit recipients are. First, bene-
fit-sharing as a norm in international human rights law and biodiversity law 
originated as a means to protect the rights and interests of IP in contexts where 
their traditional knowledge or natural resources were to be used or exploited 
by corporate or other interests. Its current status as an emerging norm in 
international human rights law and environmental law asserts the rights of 
iplc. At the very least, therefore, there should be an obligation to consider 
benefit-sharing arrangements with indigenous people and local communities 
where a project is funded by climate finance; at present this is not reflected 
by all of the environmental and social safeguards. There is a reason why hard-
fought safeguards for iplc are enshrined in international human rights law 
and biodiversity law, and what follows should not be taken to detract for that, 
or in any way dilute the significance of what is required in terms of protecting 
iplc interests. But prescribed categories of benefit-sharing recipients extend 
beyond this under international law. For instance, rights of ‘farmers’ to ben-
efit-sharing are protected in agricultural regimes,203 or those of small-scale 
fishermen in certain marine regimes.204
Moreover, in many instances benefit-sharing arrangements under climate 
finance have more in common with benefit-sharing under human rights law, 
or energy projects, as they relate to various aspects of the climate response. 
202 Cited in Vermeylen and Walker, supra note 200, 108.
203 Tsioumani, supra note 174.
204 Morgera, supra note 41, 378.
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So, renewable energy projects, seed resilience schemes, technology innova-
tion centres, etc., all are likely to have different effects and implications for a 
community, or generate benefits in circumstances where distributive justice 
requires that they be fairly allocated amongst involved or affected participants. 
This presents complex challenges in determining the scope or character of 
specific communities, which could be largely inchoate in relation to who is 
included, who is excluded, who makes the decisions about inclusion, and how 
these communities are governed internally – all of which are important issues 
in benefit-sharing practice.205 Strong governance and accountability processes 
within communities can support a fairer internal distribution of benefits and 
prevent or mitigate against social disruption and other conflicts.206 But these 
processes can also be intensely divisive, creating or exacerbating power hierar-
chies, and hence internal distributive patterns within communities.207
The extensive literature on communities in social and political science 
problematizes these questions in complex and dynamic conceptions of com-
munity.208 For benefit-sharing purposes, conceptions of community anchored 
around place or shared interests are most useful in determining how to make 
sense of ‘community’ as determinative of rights or interests of a group.209 For 
instance, del Guayo proposes a concept of ‘energy community’ as including 
those who are spatially or legally constructed, or who are formed through the 
shared experience of adverse impacts of an energy project.210 The complex 
and contested notion of ‘community’ can seem like an ungovernable complex-
ity, or an opportunity for a free-for-all in seeking undeserved benefits. But legal 
or regulatory frameworks on other levels of governance have sought to define 
205 Barrera-Hernandez, et al., supra note 3, 9, and the volume generally. For instance: 
‘Community involves not only shared identity, but to varying degrees, also the sharing 
of resources. Distributional justice issues around “sharing” may resonate within a 
community based in bonds of trust and personal relationships but may also imply not 
sharing with outsiders. Thus, the processes of definition of a community and the exercise 
of power within a community may play out in the distribution or sharing of costs and 
benefits. Indeed, many energy and resource projects may prove to be highly divisive for 
“local” communities and may lead to group conflicts.’ Also O’Faircheallaigh, supra note 46, 
223–7 and 232–3.
206 Rachel Wynberg and Maria Hauck, ‘People, Power, and the Coast: A Conceptual 
Framework for Understanding and Implementing Benefit Sharing’, 19 Ecology and Society 
27 (2014).
207 Barry Barton and Michael Goldsmith, ‘Community and Sharing’, in Barrera-Hernández, et 
al. (eds) supra note 3.
208 Ibid.
209 Savaresi, supra note 173, 9.
210 Inigo del Guayo, ‘Regional and Local Energy Communities: A European Union Perspective 
on Community Benefits’, in Barrera-Hernández, et al. (eds), supra note 3.
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the boundaries of, or conditions for, community claims.211 For instance, the 
EU Renewables Directive establishes criteria for energy communities based 
on voluntariness, autonomy, spatial proximity to the project in question, and 
membership or shareholding in a relevant governing body.212
4.6 Benefits
The final, substantive issue concerns what might be considered a ‘benefit’ in 
the broad and heterogeneous context of climate finance. Here I draw on some 
useful principles from other regimes that could help to frame what a benefit is, 
before asking some difficult questions about the relationship between benefits 
and financing instruments. Climate issues make determinations of ‘benefit’ 
particularly complicated, as do financing and monetary issues.
As discussed above, climate finance is the ‘additional’ financing provided 
to support the transition to a low-carbon society. In some instances this ‘addi-
tional’ amount reflects what is required to make a low-carbon project viable. 
So in many instances the ‘benefit’ generated with climate finance is progress 
towards the amelioration of climate change, whether in terms of projected 
carbon reductions or increased resilience. It is important to recognize that 
the benefits calculable from climate finance may not align perfectly with cli-
mate goals.213 Where projects generate profits, a financial benefit is more easily 
identifiable.214 If the only project benefits are carbon reductions, there is still 
a potential for reallocation, as employed in other areas of the climate regime. 
This is not unproblematic, for where this has been done it has also been sub-
jected to significant criticism, not least due to its disastrous implications for 
‘benefit recipients’.215
An empirical analysis of project funding through the af has revealed very 
low inclusion of ‘distributable benefits’ in project applications.216 This could 
reflect a failure or refusal to take benefit-sharing seriously; but it could also 
be indicative of an overlap between development or resilience benefits and 
211 Barton and Goldsmith, supra note 207, 39f.
212 Savaresi, supra note 173, 9.
213 See, e.g., Ara Azad and Ava Azad, ‘Energy Justice, Climate Justice, and Financing 
Innovation’, in Randall Abate (ed.), Climate Justice (Environmental Law Institute, 2016), 
where the recipients did not want the ‘green’ hydropower as a benefit, as it caused other 
problems.
214 See, e.g., Savaresi supra note 2, 10, on the heated debate concerning the reporting of non-
carbon benefits under REDD+.
215 See, e.g., Leo Peskett, Benefit Sharing in REDD+: Exploring the Implications for Poor and 
Vulnerable People (World Bank, 2011).
216 Remling and Persson, supra note 170, 9.
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adaptation funding. Take the example of seed resilience in an agricultural 
project: if the entire purpose of the project is to support farmers’ capacity in 
changing environmental conditions, there may be no benefits beyond this 
improved capacity. If such projects produce diffuse gains across local commu-
nities,217 it makes little sense to seek to distribute benefits if the project aims to 
benefit the community. From a commercial perspective, such projects reflect 
an absence: an increased resilience to climate change that benefits a local 
community in terms of what they experience less of – viz. seed loss. Still, as 
discussed below, there is potential for benefit-sharing in such arrangements – 
perhaps in shared licensing or intellectual property rights, capacity-building, 
or other educational opportunities. These are all recognized as benefits under 
different regimes in international law.
Apart from particular issues to do with climate responses or climate finance, 
there are some well-established principles that continue to be used in biodi-
versity law,218 or the law on energy or natural-resource extraction,219 which 
may be compatible with benefits arising in a different context. At a minimum, 
this should include a broad concept of ‘benefits’ which can be both monetary 
and non-monetary. For instance, a narrow conception of benefit may exclude 
indirect or non-monetary benefits (or, as discussed below, conflate these 
with other payments or entitlements), particularly if formalized approaches 
devalue non-monetary benefits.220 The Nagoya Protocol has a ‘menu’ of mone-
tary and non-monetary benefits, mostly compatible with climate finance pro-
jects; they include various kinds of financial payments, such as license fees, as 
well as payments to trust funds or taking the form of salaries; and the menu 
lists non-monetary benefits, including a range of technology-access solutions 
and capacity building, resource sharing, social recognition, and contributions 
to the local economy.221 These arrangements can be complex, combining own-
ership rights or shareholdings, which both guarantee control and transparency 
and also generate benefits as profits and share revenue. Furthermore, share-
holding arrangements are a powerful positional tool that guarantees a degree of 
ongoing control in an enterprise, which can support demands for participation 
217 Sarah Colenbrander, David Dodman, and Diana Mitlin, ‘Using Climate Finance to Advance 
Climate Justice: The Politics and Practice of Channelling Resources to the Local Level’, 
Climate Policy 1 (2017).
218 Elisa Morgera, ‘Justice, Equity and Benefit-Sharing under the Nagoya Protocol to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’, 24 The Italian Yearbook of International Law Online 113 
(2015).
219 Barrera-Hernandez, et al., supra note 3, 8.
220 See discussion in Armeni, supra note 67, 428f.
221 Nagoya Protocol, Annex 1.
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in projects and the legitimate realization of benefits. Project benefits should 
reflect the values and priorities of the recipients and be determined with their 
full participation,222 and should be needed and usable by them.
It is also important that ‘net’ benefits are considered and calculated – 
whatever is received should not be eclipsed by the costs and impacts of the 
activities on the affected community (particularly when the benefits are finan-
cial).223 The net costs should include costs of administration and management 
of the benefits fund, which might require professional services, but at the very 
least should include interest and administration charges, and may have impli-
cations for tax or other entitlements.224 For this, recipients should have a rea-
sonable expectation of transparency in relation to project revenue and the 
risks and costs anticipated under the project.225 A calculation of net benefits 
in the context of proper administration could prevent the social disruption 
frequently experienced by marginalized communities which receive sudden, 
unstructured income.226
As highlighted earlier, difficulties can arise in circumstances where involve-
ment of potential beneficiaries with projects gives rise to a range of entitle-
ments, all of which could be settled financially. A strong argument could be 
made that benefit-sharing arrangements have a reparative or compensatory 
aspect to them;227 however, the purpose of these arrangements is not to com-
pensate or make good loss, but rather to ensure that vulnerable parties are 
properly remunerated and acknowledged for their role in making the project 
possible. For instance, iplc resettled from their land, or who otherwise lose 
tenure or other rights, should be entitled to compensation or reparations for 
the loss of tenure rights or relocation. In addition, they might be entitled to ben-
efit-sharing arrangements in relation to the use of their traditional knowledge 
222 This understanding emanates from the 2002 Bonn Guidelines; see Vermeylen, supra note, 
15, 424.
223 Schwemmer et al., supra note 55. Some models refer to this as ‘sharing the burdens’, 
aligned with ‘sharing the costs’. Burden-sharing has its own meaning in climate discourse, 
and I do not consider it is helpful to use that wording in a different way. In addition, this 
does not describe well what I mean–the costs of the project to the vulnerable benefit-
recipients may not necessarily be ‘burdens’ of the project as a whole.
224 This may include entitlement to state benefits or grants, such as pensions, unemployment 
benefits, or parental support, particularly if means-tested. These issues should be 
managed, and the costs of management should be incorporated into the calculation of 
the benefit.
225 See Kemerink-Seyoum, et al., supra note 63, 266 and passim.
226 Vermeylen and Walker, supra note 200, 119.
227 Bram De Jonge, ‘What Is Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing?’, 24 Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics 127 (2011).
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or due to an infringement of residual rights.228 As discussed earlier, these dis-
tinctions should be made at an early assessment stage, but it is difficult to see 
how this could be managed in such a way as to ensure that the full range of 
available entitlements is not absorbed into other kinds of payments that might 
serve a different purpose.229
Baker explains that in some instances the very design of a project obviates 
any possibility of benefit-sharing. In the context of renewable energy projects 
funded with project finance, she writes:
With the exception of payments to the Mexican government and devel-
opment banks, all benefits flow exclusively to corporate actors. Indeed, 
the energy produced is sold to corporations … Debt payments are made 
to private banks. Once the debt payments are made, profit flows up to 
the private developers who are the initial investors in the projects. The 
structure of the projects themselves impedes any hope of authentic com-
munity benefits. Proponents of the projects point to one public good: a 
net positive reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.230
But in less intensively structured arrangements, the design of financing instru-
ments is worth investigating in terms of what might be understood to be the 
‘benefits’ arising from a project. This cannot be separated from a discussion 
about the ultimate direction of flows of climate finance.
Interest earned on supported concessional loans, and both capital and 
equity earned through supported investments, are clear monetary benefits 
generated in climate-specific situations with the support of (largely publicly 
funded) climate funds. In this sense, public climate finance supports the cre-
ation of a viable, risk-managed market for the providers of private finance, 
which generates financial benefits for them. Apart from the climate benefits, in 
commercial terms the provision of finance is only beneficial to the recipients. 
These processes and arrangements raise all sorts of questions about mutual 
interest and the possibility of shared benefits. If anything, financing arrange-
ments are inherently associated with the provision of climate finance than 
the various recipient-end projects that are funded by it. Of course, the coun-
terargument is clear: that there is no appropriate ‘benefit-sharing’ trigger in 
228 For instance, see Herrejon and Savaresi, supra note 53.
229 For instance, Craik, Gardner, and McCarthy, supra note 49, discuss how natural-resource 
agreements stipulate that impact mitigation and benefits should be dealt with separately; 
see 381–3.
230 Baker, supra note 62, 350.
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these instances, and that benefit-sharing arrangements are appropriate (and 
required) in relation to the receipt of climate finance, not its provision.
4.7 Triggers
There should be clearly defined conditions that would trigger benefit-shar-
ing obligations.231 Establishing clear triggers for benefit-sharing would help 
to clarify why benefits generated in certain contexts give rise to obligations 
to ensure equitable access, but not benefits generated in others. The differ-
ent approaches and rationales taken will affect conceptions of the benefit as 
well as the trigger. But the determinations of benefit-sharing based on markets 
and resource use, impacts, and human rights, or co-operation within projects, 
will determine to some extent when and how such projects are framed, who 
is considered a stakeholder, and how benefit-sharing arrangements would be 
constructed around them.232 Having clear and mandatory triggers means that 
less is left to chance or the discretion of decision-makers or applicants.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that benefit-sharing is an emerging norm in international envi-
ronmental law and human rights law. Broadly stated, benefit-sharing is meant 
to provide a means towards fair and equitable distribution of burdens and ben-
efits – and, as such, the achievement of practical justice – in environmental 
and natural-resource use. Despite problems in application and implementa-
tion, benefit-sharing continues to be introduced into new areas of interna-
tional environmental law, but with differing and varied conceptualizations 
and mixed results.
This article contributes to the small pool of literature which seeks to exam-
ine how benefit-sharing appears in climate change, and offers the first discus-
sion of benefit-sharing in climate finance.233 The heterogeneous nature of 
climate finance, and the conceptual and normative challenges in establishing a 
norm of benefit-sharing, make this a difficult area of enquiry. A more self-con-
tained endeavour may have sought simply to identify the formal obligations in 
this area; however, doing so without exploring some of the difficult questions 
231 See discussion in Morgera, supra note 41, 372f.
232 Ibid., 379–80.
233 By ‘specific’ I mean focusing on climate finance per se, as opposed to considering topics 
tangential to climate finance.
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arising in the messy field of benefit-sharing more generally would have been to 
ignore the difficult richness of this area.
I have sought to clarify the basis on which benefit-sharing might be read as 
an obligation in international climate change and climate finance law, but one 
that lacks substantive content. This article appraised the arguments for and 
against a more developed concept, arguing that despite the implementation 
problems reported in benefit-sharing in other areas of international environ-
mental law, the concept is likely to continue to be used to distribute benefits 
in climate-response activities. In many ways, benefit-sharing is not an easy fit 
for climate finance, but drawing on standards and research in other areas of 
international law, including human rights law, can help to flesh out some core 
requirements as to how benefit-sharing can be better conceptualized in climate 
finance. For this reason, attention is needed in terms of how benefit-sharing 
is deployed in the climate change field. Starting with an investigation of the cli-
mate funds, this article has suggested that current practice in climate finance 
has not kept pace with international minimum standards on benefit-sharing.
Finally, notwithstanding the difficulties and complexities explored herein, I 
have sought to outline some factors that would need to be considered in devel-
oping a norm of benefit-sharing in climate finance, which is specific to the 
area, but also keeps pace with international standards.
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